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Abstract
Indirect trust computation based on recommendations form an important component in trust-based access control
models for pervasive environment. It can provide the service provider the confidence to interact with unknown
service requesters. However, recommendation-based indirect trust computation is vulnerable to various types of
attacks. This paper proposes a defense mechanism for filtering out dishonest recommendations based on a measure
of dissimilarity function between the two subsets. A subset of recommendations with the highest measure of
dissimilarity is considered as a set of dishonest recommendations. To analyze the effectiveness of the proposed
approach, we have simulated three inherent attack scenarios for recommendation models (bad mouthing, ballot
stuffing, and random opinion attack). The simulation results show that the proposed approach can effectively filter
out the dishonest recommendations based on the majority rule. A comparison between the exiting schemes and our
proposed approach is also given.
Introduction
The rapid development of collaborative, dynamic, and
open environments has increased awareness on secu-
rity issues. It is becoming widely acknowledged that
traditional security measures fail to provide the nec-
essary flexibility for interactions between known and
unknown entities in an uncertain environment due to stat-
ically defined security policies and capabilities [1]. Much
research on trust-based access control models for perva-
sive environment has been carried out [2-6], which use
trust as an elementary criterion for authorizing known,
partially known, and unknown entities to interact with
each other. Indirect trust computation holds key impor-
tance in trust- based access control models. When the
service provider has no personal experience with the
requesting entity to compute direct trust, indirect trust
computation is used as a way to evaluate and distribute
trust [1]. The basis for indirect trust computation is seek-
ing recommendation for further information to define
the trustworthiness of the unfamiliar service requester. It
requests recommendation, with respect to the entity in
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question, from peer services. If peer services provide hon-
est recommendations, a service provider can accurately
determine the trustworthiness of an unknown service
requester. This gives the service provider the confidence
to interact with an unknown service requester [2].
However, reliance on peer services to seek the recom-
mendation of an unfamiliar service requester can lead
to erroneous decisions if the recommender provides rec-
ommendations that deviate from their experience. The
recommenders can falsely provide dishonest recommen-
dation either to elevate trust values of malicious entities
or to lessen the trust values of honest entities. If these
recommendations are aggregated blindly without filter-
ing false recommendations, they can skew the evaluation
of an entity’s trustworthiness. Therefore, a mechanism to
avoid the influence of dishonest recommendations from
malicious recommenders is a fundamental problem for
trust models.
Consider the following scenarios that show the
importance of recommendation models in a pervasive
environment as well as a mechanism to filter dishonest
recommendations in such models:
Scenario 1. Bob is an employee of a Paris-based
multinational company and, due to official
commitments, travels frequently between France and
the USA. Bob just arrived at Los Angeles Airport on a
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business trip and was consuming his lunch at a cafe
when he received a call from his employer to reach
Ohio by night to attend an important meeting the
next day. Incidentally Bob’s travel agent was not
available. However, Prime Travels had a seat available
to Ohio in their next flight. Using his smart phone,
Bob registers himself with the booking service of
Prime Travels and generates a request for reservation.
Since Bob has never made any reservation with the
registration service of Prime Travels before, it
broadcasts a recommendation request to the services
being offered at the airport to ascertain Bob’s
trustworthiness. It received recommendations from
different services Bob used during his transits at Los
Angeles Airport including payment to a cafe, internet
access, money transfer to a money exchange service,
and reservations made through the registration
service of some other travel agents. A few travel
agents, competitor to Prime Travels, intentionally
responded with bad recommendations. Prime Travels
requires a mechanism to filter these dishonest
recommendations from the honest one to ascertain
the trustworthiness of Bob for his decision making.
Scenario 2. Alice is a frequent visitor of H&M
shopping mall near her work place. After office
hours, while Alice was visiting the shopping mall, she
received a call from her colleague that she has
forgotten to mail an important document to one of
her customers. Alice needed internet access on her
smart phone to mail the document. Alice searches
for available internet service providers in the mall
and forwards a request to an available wireless
hotspot identified as MegaIT in the mall to allow
internet access on her device. Since she had never
used the service before, MegaIT broadcasts a
message to different services available in H&M to ask
for recommendations. Since Alice had been a
frequent visitor with a history of interactions with
other shopping, saloon, and dining services in the
mall, these service providers give recommendations
to MegaIT. In order to grant access, MegaIT requires
some mechanism to determine which
recommendations it should use to determine the
trustworthiness of Alice.
There can be three possible types of malicious recom-
mendation [7]. Bad mouthing recommendations (BM) are
those malicious recommendations that cause the eval-
uated trustworthiness of an entity to decrease, ballot
stuffing (BS) recommendations cause the evaluated trust-
worthiness of the entity to increase, and random opinion
(RO) recommendations are those in which a recom-
mender gives the recommendations randomly opposite
the true behavior of the entity in question. In this paper,
we propose a new mechanism to filter out dishonest
nodes from influencing the indirect trust computation.
The proposedmechanism (an extension of [8]) is based on
the assumption that a dishonest recommendation is one
that is inconsistent with other recommendations and has
a low probability of occurrence in the recommendation
set. Based on this assumption, a new dissimilarity func-
tion for detecting deviations in a recommendation set is
defined. An extensive comparison between the proposed
and existing techniques is also provided to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.
Related work
The dynamism of pervasive computing environment
allows ad hoc interaction of known and unknown
autonomous entities that are unfamiliar and possibly hos-
tile. In such environment where the service providers
have no personal experience with unknown service
requesters, trust and recommendation models are used
to evaluate the trustworthiness of unfamiliar entities.
Recently, research in designing defense mechanisms to
detect dishonest recommendation in these open dis-
tributed environments has been carried out [9-26]. The
defense mechanisms against dishonest recommendations
has been grouped into two broad categories, namely
exogenous method and endogenous method [9]. The
approaches that fall under endogenous method use other
external factors along with the recommendations (repu-
tation of recommender and credibility of recommender)
to decide the trustworthiness of the given recommenda-
tion. However, these approaches assume that only highly
reputed recommenders can give honest recommenda-
tions and vice versa. In [10], Xiong and Liu presented an
approach (PeerTrust) that avoids aggregation of the indi-
vidual interactions. Their model computes the trustwor-
thiness of a given peer based on the community feedback
about the participant’s past behavior. The credibility fac-
tor of the feedback source is computed using a function of
trust value as its credibility value. The model also incor-
porates personalized similarity between the experience
with other partners for reputation on ranking discrep-
ancy. Chen et al. [11] distinguishes between recommenda-
tions by computing the reputation for each recommender.
The reputation is measured on the basis of the quality
and quantity of recommendation it provides. The recom-
mender’s reputation is used as a weight when aggregating
the recommendations of all the recommenders. However,
the model does not consider the service type of the rec-
ommender on which its recommendation is based. Malik
and Bouguettaya [12] also proposed using rater credibility
for its recommendation assessment. It believes that only
highly reputed recommenders can give honest recom-
mendations. These models use other external information
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sources to gather the reputations of the recommender.
Ganeriwal et al. [13] believe that the weight of its recom-
mendations about others is dependent on its own repu-
tation for service providing. In other words, if it provides
a reliable service, then the recommendations it provides
is also reliable. In [14], the global reputation of a node is
aggregated from local trust scores weighted by the global
reputation scores of all senders. Since these models are
based on the assumption that entities with high reputation
provide honest recommendations, that makes it vulnera-
ble to attack. A smart attacker may behave well for a while
to get a high reputation and then provide all dishonest rec-
ommendations that cannot be detected by schemes using
reputation [15], that is, a recommender can build repu-
tation with different expectations and intentions, and the
recommendation they provide can be different from their
experience. Recently, models for online communities have
proposed using the social element of the recommender as
an additional source of information in the recommender
system. They believe that people trust their peers with
whom they are socially connected and use their recom-
mendations. The main idea behind this approach is that
users tend to connect to users with similar preferences.
Trusting the opinion of others is based on the social
link between the two entities. In [16], the authors pre-
sented the correlation between trust and social networks
by establishing a rating system for movies based on com-
munity system. They demonstrated in their experiments
that social trust is able to evaluate similarity in a more dis-
tinctive way when the ratings are extreme and with large
differences. In [17], the authors have modeled a social
network as a directed graph and have evaluated recom-
mendations based on the position and interconnections
of the user represented as actors in the graph. The model
employs social network analysis metric including central-
ity and rank prestige to identify the influence of actors in
the social network. In [18], a framework to build a rec-
ommendation system by identifying a group of experts
in a social network is proposed. The model recommends
experts with appropriate knowledge based on the infor-
mation desired by the user. The authors elaborate the
efficiency of the proposed approach by applying themodel
in a research community. In [19], the authors present a
probabilistic matrix factorization approach for the rec-
ommender system. The model applies trusted friends’
opinion in a social network to gather recommendations.
The research believes that the user’s friend recommenda-
tion has an impact on user preferences in a social network.
All these models [16-19] believe that there exist social
relationships between users in the system that affect the
evaluation of recommendation trustworthiness. However,
in open spaces comprised of multiple devices (perva-
sive environment), these devices in close physical prox-
imity form an ad hoc network for spontaneous service
access [20]. In such an open, dynamic environment where
devices are continuously leaving/joining the network, it is
difficult to rely on a formal social relationship.
In endogenous method, the recommendation seeker
has no personal experience with the entity in question.
It relies only on the recommendations provided by the
recommender to detect dishonest recommendation. The
method believes that dishonest recommendations have
different statistical patterns from honest recommenda-
tions. Therefore, in this method, filtering of dishonest
recommendation is based on analyzing and comparing
the recommendations themselves. In trust models where
indirect trust based on recommendations is used only
once to allow a stranger entity to interact, endogenous
method based on the majority rule is commonly used.
Dellarocas [21] has proposed an approach based on con-
trolled anonymity to separate unfairly high ratings and
fair ratings. This approach is unable to handle unfairly
low ratings [22]. In [23], a filtering algorithm based on
the beta distribution is proposed to determine whether
each recommendation Ri falls between q quartile (lower)
and (1 − q) quartile (upper). Whenever a recommenda-
tion does not lie between the lower and upper quartile,
it is considered malicious and its recommendation is
excluded. The technique assumes that recommendations
follow beta distribution and is effective only if there are
effectively a large number of recommendations. Weng
et al. in [24] proposed a filtering mechanism based on
entropy.The basic idea is that if a recommendation is too
different from majority opinion, then it could be unfair.
The approach is similar to other reputation-based models
except that it uses entropy to differentiate between differ-
ent recommendations. A context-specific and reputation-
based trust model for pervasive computing environment
was proposed [25] to detect malicious recommendation
based on control chart method. The control chart method
uses mean and standard deviation to calculate the lower
confidence limit (LCL) and upper confidence limit (UCL).
It is assumed that the recommendation values that lie out-
side the interval defined by LCL and UCL are malicious,
therefore discarded from the set of valid recommenda-
tions. It considers that a metrical distance exists between
valid and invalid recommendations. As a result, the rate
of filtering out the false positive and false negative rec-
ommendation is really high. Deno et al. [26] proposed
an iterative filtering method for the process of detecting
malicious recommendations. In this model [26], an aver-
age trust value (Tavg) of all the recommendations received
(TR) is calculated.
The inequality | Tavg(B) − TR(B) |> S, where B is the
entity for which recommendations are collected from
i recommenders (R) and S is a predefined threshold in
the interval [0 1], is evaluated. If that inequality holds,
then the recommendation is false and is filtered out. The
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method is repeated until all false recommendations are
filtered out. The effectiveness of this approach depends
on choosing a suitable value for S. These detection mech-
anisms can be easily bypassed if a relatively small bias is
introduced in dishonest recommendations.
Proposed approach
The objective of indirect trust computation is to
determine the trustworthiness of an unfamiliar service
requester from the set of recommendations that nar-
row the gap between the derived recommendation and
the actual trustworthiness of the target service. In our
approach, a dishonest recommendation is defined as an
outlier that appears to be inconsistent with other recom-
mendations and has a low probability that it originated
from the same statistical distribution as the other rec-
ommendation in the data set. The importance of detect-
ing outliers in data has been recognized in the fields of
database and data mining for a long time. The outlier
deviation-based approach was first proposed in [27], in
which an exact exception problem was discussed. In [8],
the author presented a new method for deviation-based
outlier detection in a large database. The algorithm locates
the outlier by a dynamic programming method. In this
paper, we have extended this outlier detection technique
to filter out dishonest recommendations. Our approach
(Algorithm 1) is based on the fact that if a recommen-
dation is far from the median value of a given recom-
mendation set and has a lower frequency of occurrence,
it is filtered out as a dishonest recommendation. Suppose
that an entity X requests to access service A. If service A
has no previous interaction history with X, it will broad-
cast the request for recommendations, with respect to X.
Let R denote the set of recommendations collected from
recommenders.
R = {r1, r2, r3, . . . . . . , rn}
where n is the total number of recommendations. Since
smart attackers can give recommendations with little
bias to go undetected, we divide the range of possi-
ble recommendation values into b intervals (or bins).
These bins define which recommendations we consider
to be similar to each other such that all recommenda-
tions that lie in the same bin are considered alike. b
has an impact on the detection rate. If the bins are too
wide, honest recommendations might get filtered out as
dishonest. On the other hand, if the bins are too nar-
row, some dishonest recommendations may appear to
be honest and vise versa. In this paper, we have tuned
b = 10 such that Rc1 comprises all recommendations
that lie between interval [0 0.1], Rc2 comprises all rec-
ommendations between interval [0.1 0.2], and so on for
(Rc3, . . . , Rc10). After grouping the recommendations
in their respective bins, we compute a histogram that
shows count fi of the recommendations falling in each
bin. Let H be a histogram of a set of recommendation
classes where
H(R) = {〈Rc1, f1〉, 〈Rc2, f2〉, 〈Rc3, f3〉, 〈Rc4, f4〉, 〈Rc5, f5〉,
〈Rc6, f6〉, 〈Rc7, f71〉, 〈Rc8, f8〉, 〈Rc9, f9〉, 〈Rc10, f10〉
}
where fi is the total number of recommendations falling
in Rci. From this histogram H(R), we remove all the rec-
ommendation classes with zero frequencies and get the
domain set (Rdomain) and frequency set (f )
Rdomain = {Rc1,Rc2,Rc3, . . . . . . ,Rc10}
f = {f1, f2, f3, . . . . . . , f10
}
.
Definition 1. The dissimilarity function DF(xi) is
defined as





Require: Set of Recommendations
Ensure: Rdomaindishonest
1: for i = 1 → 10 do
2: Rci = i/10
3: fi = number of recommendations in interval
[i/10 − 0.1, i/10]
4: end for
5: for i = 1 → 10 do
6: if fi <> 0 then
7: Rdomain[k]= Rci
8: H[k + +]= {Rci, fi}
9: end if
10: end for
11: x = Median(Rdomain)







15: SRdomain = SortDesc(Rdomain, DF)
16: D0 = ∅




19: SFk = SmoothingFactor(Dj)
20: end for
21: SFmax = max (SF(Dk))
22: fmin = min freq of k in SRdomain with SF = SFmax
23: Rdomaindishonest = all k in SRdomain with SFk =
SFmax and fk = fmin
24: return Rdomaindishonest
Iltaf et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking 2013, 2013:189 Page 5 of 13
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2013/1/189
where xi is a recommendation class from a recommenda-
tion set x.
Under the proposed approach, the dissimilarity value
of xi is dependent on the square of absolute deviation
from the median, i.e., |xi − median(x)|2. The median is
used to detect deviation because it is resistant to out-
liers. The presence of outliers does not change the value
of the median. In Equation 1, the square of absolute devi-
ation from the median is taken to signify the impact of
extremes, i.e., the farther the recommendation value xi
is from the median, the larger the squared deviation is.
Moreover, the dissimilarity value of xi is inversely propor-
tional to its frequency. In Equation 1, |xi − median(x)|2 is
divided by frequency fi. In this way, if a recommendation
is very far from the rest of the recommendations and its
frequency of occurrence is also low, Equation 1 will return
a high value. Similarly, if a recommendation is close to the
rest of the recommendations (i.e., similar to each other)
and its frequency of occurrence is also high, Equation 1
will return a low value.
For each Rci, a dissimilarity value is computed using
Equation 1 to represent its dissimilarity from the rest of
the recommendations with regard to their frequency of
occurrence. All the recommendation classes in Rdomain
are then sorted with respect to their dissimilarity value
DF(Rci) in descending order. The recommendation class
at the top of the sorted Rdomain with respect to its
DF(xj) is considered to be the most suspicious one to
be filtered out as dishonest recommendation. Once the
Rdomain is sorted, the next step is to determine the
set of dishonest recommendation classes from Rdomain
set. To help find the set of dishonest recommendation
classes from the set of recommendations in Rdomain,
Arning et al. [27] defined a measure called smoothing
factor (SF).
Definition 2. A SF for each SRdomain is computed as
SF(SRdomainj) = C(Rdomain − SRdomainj)
× (DF(Rdomain) − DF(SRdomainj))
(2)
where j = 1, 2, 3 . . . ,m, and m is the total number of
distinct elements in SRdomain. C is the cardinality func-
tion and is taken as the frequency of elements in a set{
Rdomain − SRdomainj
}
. The SF indicates howmuch the
dissimilarity can be reduced by removing a suspicious set
of recommendation (SRdomain) from the Rdomain.
Definition 3. The dishonest recommendation domain
(Rdomaindishonest) is a subset of Rdomain that contributes
most to the dissimilarity of Rdomain and with the least
number of recommendations, i.e., Rdomaindishonest ⊆
Rdomain. We say that SRdomainx is a set of dishonest rec-
ommendation classes with respect to SRdomain, C, and
DF(SRdomainj) if
SF(SRdomainx) ≥ SF(SRdomainj) x, j ∈ m
for all Rdomain, C, and SRdomainj.
In order to find out the set of dishonest recommen-
dation Rdomaindishonest from Rdomain, the mechanism
defined by the proposed approach is as follows:
• Let Rck be the kth recommendation class of Rdomain
and SRdomain be the set of suspicious
recommendation classes from Rdomain, i.e.,
SRdomain ⊆ Rdomain.
• Initially, SRdomain is an empty set, SRdomain0 = {}
• Compute SF(SRdomaink) for each SRdomaink
formed by taking the union of SRdomaink−1 and Rck .
SRdomaink = SRdomaink−1 ∪ Rck (3)
where k = 1, 2, 3 . . . ,m − 1, and m is the distinct
recommendation class value number in sorted
Rdomain.
• The subset SRdomaink with the largest
SF(SRdomaink) is considered as a set containing
dishonest recommendation classes.
• If two or more subsets in SRdomaink have the largest
SF, the one with minimum frequency is detected as
the set containing dishonest recommendation classes.
After detecting the set Rdomaindishonest, we remove all
recommendations that fall under the dishonest recom-
mendation classes.
An illustrative example
To illustrate how our deviation detection mechanism fil-
ters out unfair recommendations, this section provides
an example that goes through each step of our pro-
posed approach. Let X be a service requester who has
no prior experience with service provider A. In order
to determine the trustworthiness of X, A will request
recommendations from its peer services who have pre-
vious interaction with X. Let R = {r1, r2, r3, . . . . . . , rn}
be a set of recommendations received by n = 122 rec-
ommenders for service requester R. After receiving the
recommendations, they are grouped in their respective
bins. Table 1 shows how the received recommendations
are grouped in their respective classes. After arranging
the recommendations in their respective recommenda-
tion class Rci, we remove the recommendation classes
with zero frequencies and calculate DF(Rci) for each rec-
ommendation class using Equation 1. Table 2 shows the
sorted list of recommendation classes with respect to their
dissimilarity value.
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Table 1 Frequency distribution of recommendations











In Table 2 the recommendation class Rc5 has the highest
deviation value, so it is taken as a suspicious recommenda-
tion class and is added to the suspicious recommendation
domain (SRdomain), and its SF is calculated. Next we
take the union of the suspicious recommendation domain
SRdomain1 and the next recommendation class in the
sorted list, i.e., Rc4 and calculate its SF using Equation 2.
This process is repeated for each Rci of Rdomain until
SRdomain = Rdomain − Rcm, wherem = 5.
Table 3 shows that the SF of SRdomain2 has the highest
value. Therefore, the recommendation classes {0.8, 0.9} in
SRdomain3 are considered as dishonest recommendation
classes, and these recommendation classes are removed
from the Rdomain.
Performance evaluation of the proposed approach
In this section, we evaluate our model in a simulated
multi-agent environment. We carry out different sets of
experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of the pro-
posedmodel against different attack scenarios (BM attack,
BS attack, and RO attack). Results indicate that the model
is able to respond to all three types of attack when the per-
centage of malicious recommenders is varied from 10% to
40%. We have also studied the performance of the model
by varying the offset introduced by the malicious recom-
mender in their recommended trust value. It was observed
that the performance of the models decreases only when
Table 2 Recommendation classes sorted with respect to
their DF
Rci Recommendation value rci Frequency fi DF(Rci)
Rc5 0.9 8 0.061249
Rc4 0.8 13 0.02769
Rc3 0.3 37 2.7027E−4
Rc1 0.1 41 2.4390E−4
Rc2 0.2 23 0.0
Table 3 Smoothing factor computation
SRdomain Rdomain SRdomain DF(Rdomain) SF
{0.9} {0.8, 0.3, 0.1, 0.2} 0.061 6.9825
{0.9, 0.8} {0.3, 0.1, 0.2} 0.0889 8.9317
{0.9, 0.8, 0.3} {0.1, 0.2} 0.0890 5.967
{0.9, 0.8.0.3, 0.1} {0.2} 0.0894 2.0574
the percentage of malicious recommenders is above 30%
and the mean offset between the honest and dishonest
recommendation is minimum (0.2).
Experimental setup
We simulate a multi-agent environment using AnyLogic
6.4, where agents (offering and requesting services) are
continuously joining and leaving the environment. The
agents are categorized into two groups, i.e., agents offering
services as service provider agents (SPA) and agents con-
suming services as service requesting agents (SRA). We
conduct a series of experiments for a new SPA to evalu-
ate the trustworthiness of an unknown SRA by requesting
recommendation from other SPAs in the environment.
All SPAs can also act as recommending agents (RA) for
other SPAs . The RA gives recommendations, in a con-
tinuous range [0 1], for a given SRA on the request of a
SPA. The RA can either be honest or dishonest depending
on the trustworthiness of its recommendation. An hon-
est RA truthfully provides recommendation based on its
personal experience, whereas a dishonest RA insinuates a
true experience to a high, low, or erratic recommendation
with a malicious intent. The environment is initialized
with set numbers of honest and dishonest recommenders
(N = 100). The simulation is run in steps, the total number
of which is defined by NSTEPS.
Experiment 1 : validation against attacks
To analyze the effectiveness of the proposed approach,
three inherent attack scenarios (bad mouthing, ballot
stuffing, and random opinion attack) for recommenda-
tion models have been implemented in the above defined
simulation environment.
Badmouthing attack
BM is one in which the intention of the attacker is to
send malicious recommendations that will cause the eval-
uated trustworthiness of an entity to decrease. Let us
suppose that the service provider asks for recommen-
dations regarding an unknown service requester A. In
this experiment we assume that a certain percentage of
the recommenders are dishonest and launch a BM attack
against (A) by giving dishonest recommendations. It is
assumed that the actual trust value of A is 0.7. At the
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initial step of the simulation, the environment has 10% dis-
honest RA who attempt to launch a bad mouthing attack
against A by providing low recommended trust values
(between the range [0 0.3]). To elaborate the efficacy of
the proposed approach, we vary the percentage of dis-
honest recommenders from 10% to 40%. Figure 1a,b,c,d
shows the SF calculated for each SRdomain. It is shown
that in each case the proposed approach is able to
detect the set of bad mouthers giving low recommen-
dation between 0.1 and 0.3. For example, in Figure 1a
when the percentage of dishonest recommenders is
10%, the SRdomains and respective SF values are as
follows:
SRdomain 1 {0.1}, 8.64
SRdomain 2 {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.8}, 13.62
SRdomain 3 {0.1, 0.2}, 16.12
SRdomain 4 {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.8, 0.6}, 6.82
SRdomain 5 {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}, 20.4
Since the SF of SRdomain5 has the highest value, the
recommendation classes {0.1, 0.2, 0.3} are considered as
dishonest recommendation classes, and the recommen-
dations that belong to these recommendation classes are
considered as dishonest recommendations.
Ballot stuffing attack
BS is one in which the intention of the attacker is to
send malicious recommendations that will cause the eval-
uated trustworthiness of an entity to increase. Let us
suppose that the service provider asks for recommen-
dations regarding an unknown service requester B. It is
assumed that the actual trust value of B is 0.3. A certain
percentage of recommenders providing the recommenda-
tion to the service provider are dishonest and gives a high
recommendation value between 0.8 to 1.0, thus launching
a BS attack. We evaluate the proposed approach by vary-
ing the percentage of dishonest recommenders from 10%
to 40%. Figure 1e,f,g,h shows the SF values for SRdomains
in each case. It is evident from the results that the model is
able to detect dishonest recommendations even when the
percentage of dishonest recommendations is 40%. From
Figure 1h (when the percentage of dishonest recommen-
dations is 40%), the SF values of each SRdomain are as
follows:
SRdomain 1 {1.0, 0.9}, 5.038
SRdomain 2 {1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 0.1, 0.2}, 1.843
SRdomain 3 {1.0, 0.9, 0.8}, 5.47
SRdomain 4 {1.0}, 4.41
SRdomain 5 {1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 0.1}, 3.667
The proposed approach is able to detect the dishon-
est recommendations as SRdomain 3 with the highest SF
value of 5.47.
Randomopinion attack
RO attack is one in which the malicious recommender
gives the recommendations randomly opposite the true
behavior of the entity in question. Let us suppose that the
recommenders launch a RO attack while providing rec-
ommendations for a service requester C. The dishonest
recommenders provide either very low recommendations
(0.1 to 0.2) or very high recommendations (0.8 to 1.0). We
vary the percentage of dishonest recommenders from 10%
to 40% for the experiment. The SF values for the respective
SRdomains in each case are shown in Figure 1i,j,k,l. The
proposed approach successfully detects random opinion
attack and is able to filter out the dishonest set of recom-
menders in each case.
Experiment 2: validation against deviation
The detection rate of unfair recommendations by vary-
ing the number of malicious recommenders cannot fully
describe the performance of the model as the damage
caused by different malicious recommenders can be very
different depending on the disparity between the true
recommendation and unfair recommendation(i.e., offset).
The offset introduced by the attackers in the recom-
mended trust value is a key factor in instilling deviation
in the evaluated trust value of SRA. We have carried out a
set of experiments to observe the impact of different offset
values introduced by different malicious recommenders
on the final trust value. We define mean offset (MO) as
the difference between the mean of honest recommenda-
tions and the mean of dishonest recommendations. For
the experiment, we have divided MO into four differ-
ent levels L1 = 0.2, L2 = 0.4, L3 = 0.6, and L4 =
0.8. It is assumed that the actual trust value of SRA is
0.2, and the dishonest recommender’s goal is to boost
the recommended trust value of SRA (BS attack). The
experiment was conducted in four different rounds by
varying the MO level from L4 to L1 (i.e., from maximum
to minimum). In each round, the recommended trust
value is computed with different percentages of dishonest
recommenders (10%, 20%, 30%, and 40%).
Figure 2 shows the performance of the proposed
approach during each round of the experiment. The
results in Figure 2a,b show that when the MO level is
high (L3 and L4), the proposed approach computes the
actual recommended trust value accurately for all percent-
ages of dishonest recommenders. However, in Figure 2c,d,
when the MO level (L1 and L2) is low, the detection rate
of the proposed approach deteriorates slightly because
the dishonest recommendations are very close to the
honest recommendations. However, it is also observed
that even though the detection rate is low due to less
MO between honest and dishonest recommendations, the
damage caused by undetected dishonest recommenda-
tions is very low. The largest damage was observed when


















































SRDomain 1 {0.1} 8.64
SRDomain 2 {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.8} 13.62
SRDomain 3 {0.1,0.2} 16.12
SRDomain 4 {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.8,0.6} 6.82

















































SRDomain 1 {0.1} 5.64
SRDomain 2 {0.1,0.2} 8.947
SRDomain 3 {0.1,0.2,0.6,0.8} 3.09
SRDomain 4 {0.1,0.2,0.3} 9.733

















































SRDomain 1 {0.1} 0.9
SRDomain 2 {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.8} 2.053
SRDomain 3 {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.8,0.7} 1.037
SRDomain 4 {0.1,0.2} 2.8

















































SRDomain 1 {0.1} 1.417
SRDomain 2 {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.8} 1.533
SRDomain 3 {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.8,0.7} 0.77
SRDomain 4 {0.1,0.2} 1.528

















































SRDomain 1 {0.9,1.0,0.8,0.1} 26.62
SRDomain 2 {0.9,1.0,0.8} 39.9
SRDomain 3 {0.9,0.8,0.1,0.3} 13.32
SRDomain 4 {0.9,1.0} 30.07

















































SRDomain 1 {1.0,0.9,0.8,0.3,0.1} 5.82
SRDomain 2 {1.0,0.9} 16.53
SRDomain 3 {1.0,0.9,0.8,0.3} 12.852
SRDomain 4 {1.0,0.9,0.8} 18.667

















































SRDomain 1 {1.0,0.9,0.8,0.3,0.1} 2.997
SRDomain 2 {1.0,0.9} 9.04
SRDomain 3 {1.0,0.9,0.8,0.3} 7.467
SRDomain 4 {1.0,0.9,0.8} 10.43

















































SRDomain 1 {1.0,0.9} 5.038
SRDomain 2 {1.0,0.9,0.8,0.1,0.2} 1.843
SRDomain 3 {1.0,0.9,0.8} 5.47
SRDomain 4 {1.0} 4.41





























































































































































































(a) (b) (c) (d)
(h)(g)(f)(e)
(i) (j) (k) (l)
Figure 1 Detecting attack. (a) BM, 10% dishonest recommender. (b) BM, 20% dishonest recommender. (c) BM, 30% dishonest recommender. (d)
BM, 40% dishonest recommender. (e) BS, 10% dishonest recommender. (f) BS, 20% dishonest recommender. (g) BS, 30% dishonest recommender.
(h) BS, 40% dishonest recommender. (i) RO, 10% dishonest recommender. (j) RO, 20% dishonest recommender. (k) RO, 30% dishonest
recommender. (l) RO, 40% dishonest recommender.
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Figure 2 Accuracy by varying offset.Mean offset at (a) L4, (b) L3, (c) L2, and (d) L1.
the percentage of dishonest recommenders is 40% and the
mean offset is 0.2 (Figure 2d). In this case, the bias intro-
duced by the undetected dishonest recommendation in
recommended trust value (0.25 − 0.2 = 0.05) is a very
low value and does not have much impact on the final
recommended trust value.
Comparative experiments
In this section, we focus on the comparative analysis on
our proposed approach with other competing approaches.
Since the proposed approach is an extension of [8], we
have carried out a set of experiments to demonstrate the
improved performance of the proposed approach as com-
pared to [8] termed as the base model. The experimental
results substantiate the enhanced capability of the pro-
posed approach to detect dishonest recommendations by
varying MO and the percentage of dishonest recommen-
dations. On the contrary, the performance of the base
model degrades considerably as compared to the pro-
posed approach. In the literature, many approaches have
been proposed to evaluate accurate recommended trust
value in the presence of dishonest recommendations. We
compare the performance of our proposed approach with
those of Ahamed et al. [25],Whitby et al. [23], and Deno et
al. [26]. These three models utilize endogenous approach
based onmajority rule to evaluate the recommended trust
value and are, therefore, comparable in their capability
and performance with the proposed approach.
Comparison with the base model
In the last section, it was observed that MO and the
number of dishonest recommenders play a vital role in
introducing deviation in the recommended trust value.
The efficiency of the proposed approach has been estab-
lished through a series of experimental results. In order
to further elucidate the performance of the proposed
approach, a comparative analysis between the proposed
approach and the base model [8] was carried out. It has
already been established that dishonest recommendations
are difficult to detect when either the percentage of the
dishonest recommenders is high or the MO level is very
low. Therefore, in this experiment we have simulated two
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scenarios: (1) the MO level is set very low (L1 = 0.2), and
the percentage of dishonest recommenders is varied from
10%to 48%; (2) the MO level is kept very high (L4 = 0.8)
while varying the percentage of dishonest recommenders
from 10%to 48%. The experiment was conducted for 50
simulation runs, each time with different randomly gener-
ated data set of honest and dishonest recommendations.
Figure 3 shows the average detection rate of the proposed
approach and base model observed during each round
of the experiment. Figure 3a shows that the proposed
approach can accurately detect dishonest recommenda-
tions when their percentage is less than 36%. Even when
the percentage of dishonest recommenders is 48%, the
detection rate is higher than 70%, whereas the base model
is unable to detect all dishonest recommenders even when
the percentage of dishonest recommendations is as low
as 10%. Moreover, Figure 3b shows that at high MO level
(L4), the detection rate of the base model drastically falls
as the percentage of dishonest recommendations exceeds
28%. On the contrary, the performance of the proposed
approach remains 100% when the percentage of dishonest
recommenders is less than 50%.
Comparison with existing approaches
To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed deviation-
based approach in detecting dishonest recommendations,
we have compared our approach with other approaches
proposed in the literature based on quartile [23], control
limit chart [25], and iterative filtering [26] to detect dis-
honest recommendations in indirect trust computation. A
set of experiments has been carried out by applying the
approaches to detect dishonest recommendations in two
different scenarios. For the first set of experiments, we
assume that a certain percentage of the recommenders are
dishonest and launch bad mouthing attack by giving rec-
ommendations between 0.1 to 0.3. For the second set of
experiments, the dishonest recommenders are assumed
to give a high recommendation value between 0.8 to 1.0,
thus launching a ballot stuffing attack. In both set of
experiments, the percentage of dishonest recommenders
is varied from 10% to 45%. For comparison, we have used
Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC) to measure the
accuracy of all four approaches in detecting dishonest
recommendations [28]. MCC is defined as a measure of
the quality of binary (two-class) classifications. It takes
into account true and false positives and negatives. The
formula used for MCC calculation is
MCC = (TP × TN) − (FP × FN)√
(TP + FP)(TP + FN)(TN + FP)(TN + FN)
where TP is the number of true positives, TN is the
number of true negatives, FP is the number of false pos-
itives, and FN is the number of false negatives. MCC
returns a value between −1 and 1 (1 means perfect
filtering, 0 indicates no better than random filtering,
and −1 represents total inverse filtering). To avoid infi-
nite results while calculating MCC, it is assumed that
if any of the four sums (TP, FP, TN, and FN) in the
denominator is zero, the denominator is arbitrarily set
to one.
The Figure 4 shows the comparison of MCC values of
the proposed approach with different models with vary-
ing percentage of dishonest recommendations (from 10%
to 4%). According to the results, the proposed approach
can effectively detect dishonest recommendations evident
from a constant MCC of +1 for both sets of experiments.
On the other hand, in [25], in the case of bad mouthing
attack (Figure 4a), MCC increases slowly as the percent-
age of dishonest recommenders increases from 10% to
30% but then decreases promptly to 0 as the percentage of
dishonest recommender increases from 30% to 45%. The
same behavior was observed in the case of ballot stuffing
attack (Figure 4b). In [26], when the percentage of dishon-
est recommender increases to 40%, theMCC rate starts to
decrease as well. Thus, all three approaches ([25,26], and
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Figure 3 Comparison between the base model and proposedmodel. (a)Mean offset is low. (b)Mean offset is high.
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Figure 4 Filtering accuracy in terms of MCC. (a) Bad mouthing attack and (b) ballot stuffing.
[23]) fail to achieve perfect filtering of dishonest recom-
mendation as the percentage of dishonest recommenders
increases.
For an in-depth analysis of [25,26], and [23], false posi-
tive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR) are computed
for using the following equations:
FPR = FPFP + TN
and
FNR = FNFN + TP
The value of FPR and FNR lies between [0 1]. The
lower value of FPR and FNR indicates better performance.
Figure 5a shows the comparison of FNR and FPR of [25]
with the proposed approach based on the results accu-
mulated after the experiments for BM attack. Although
the FPR of [25] remains consistent at zero when the
percentage of dishonest recommendations is increased
from 10% to 40%, at the same time, its FNR progres-
sively increases and reaches its maximum value at 40%.
Similarly, Figure 5b shows that [26] maintains zero FPR
and FNR until dishonest recommenders are less than
30% of the total recommenders. However, as the num-
ber of dishonest recommenders increases above 30%, the
model behaves poorly by showing a rapid increase in
FPR and FNR. Figure 5c shows that although the FPR
of [23] improves as the percentage of dishonest recom-
menders increases, simultaneously, the FNR starts to grow
rapidly for percentages greater than 20%. On the con-
trary, the proposed approachmaintains zero FNR and FPR
even when the percentage of dishonest recommenders
reaches 40%. Figure 6a explicates the results observed
from the performance of [25] under ballot stuffing attack.
The approach maintains zero FPR throughout the exper-
iment; however, it filtered out a high number of hon-
est recommenders as dishonest, evident from the high
FNR. Similarly, the performance of [26] remains stable
until the percentage of dishonest recommenders remains
below 30% (Figure 6b). However, the approach also shows
a rapid growth in FNR as the percentage of dishonest
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Figure 5 FPR vs FNR (in badmouthing attack). (a) Control limit charts. (b) Iterative filtering. (c) Quartile.
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Figure 6 FPR vs FNR (in ballot stuffing attack). (a) Control limit charts. (b) Iterative filtering. (c) Quartile.
recommenders increases above 30%. Figure 6c shows that
[23] is completely unable to detect ballot stuffing. The
approach shows a high FPR even at low percentages of
dishonest recommenders. It can be seen from the results
of Figures 5 and 6 that the proposed approach remains
resistant to the attack under both experiments (as the
FBR and FNR remains zero), thus outperforming other
approaches.
From the above discussion, we can conclude that both
[25] and [23] perform poorly in the presence of increas-
ing percentage of dishonest recommenders. It is also
observed that [26] performs well provided that the rec-
ommendation threshold is selected appropriately. On the
contrary, the proposed approach is not reliant on any
external parameter and is able to detect 100% dishon-
est recommenders provided that they are in the minority
(<50%).
Conclusions
Amechanism for detecting dishonest recommendation in
indirect trust computation is proposed. The main focus
in the present work was to detect dishonest recommenda-
tions based on their dissimilarity value from the complete
recommendation set. Since median is resistent to out-
lier, we have proposed a dissimilarity function that cap-
tures how dissimilar a recommendation class is from the
median of the recommendation set. The algorithm uses a
smoothing factor which detects malicious recommenda-
tions by evaluating the impact on the dissimilarity metric
by removing a subset of recommendation classes from the
set of recommendations.
Experimental evaluation shows the effectiveness of our
proposed method in filtering dishonest recommendations
in comparison with the base model. Results show that
the proposed method is successfully able to detect dis-
honest recommendations by utilizing absolute deviation
from the median as compared to the base technique
which tends to fail as the percentage of dishonest rec-
ommendations increases. We have carried out a detailed
comparative analysis with the base approach by varying
the percentage and the offset introduced by the dishonest
recommendations. Results that indicate improved per-
formance of the proposed approach, which is able to
produce 70% detection rate at a minimum offset of 0.2,
have been shown. On the contrary, the base approach is
unable to detect any dishonest recommendations at all.
It is also shown that for different attacks (bad mouthing,
ballot stuffing, and random opinion attack), the pro-
posed method successfully filters out dishonest recom-
mendations. A comparison between existing approaches
and the proposed approach is also presented, which
clearly shows the better performance of the proposed
approach. In our future work, we will study the possi-
bility of incorporating the proposed approach to existing
reputation models that make decision on the basis of
recommendations.
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